T he handicap principle is an important pillar in our understanding of animal communication (Wiley 1994; Ryan 1997; Zahavi & Zahavi 1997) . The handicap concept comes from a sports analogy: 'The investment that animals make in signals is similar to the ''handicaps'' imposed on the stronger contestants in a game or sporting event ' (Zahavi & Zahavi 1997, page XIV) . The concept suggests that 'conspicuous waste' is essential to reliable signalling. 'The Handicap Principle is a very simple idea: waste can make sense, because by wasting one proves conclusively that one has enough assets to waste and more ' (Zahavi & Zahavi 1997, page 229) . A common interpretation of the handicap principle is that signal size is correlated to sender quality because low-quality signallers cannot afford bigger signals. I will show that, although this is a reasonable interpretation of reliable signalling, the handicap principle itself is superfluous (exceeding what is sufficient or necessary).
In an earlier paper I showed that the conventional explanation of how reliable signalling is stabilized by differences in marginal costs lacks generality (Getty 1998). Costs are necessary to establish a trade-off, but differences in marginal costs are neither necessary nor sufficient to explain reliable signalling (see also Johnstone 1997; Reeve 1997). The fundamental requirement for reliability is that the fitness (w) of higher-quality (q) signallers has to be more sensitive to advertising (a), at least near the equilibrium:
(Getty 1998). This can be interpreted to mean that higher-quality signallers must be more efficient at converting advertising to fitness.
In this paper, I go beyond the stability requirements to a fundamental premise of the handicap principle, that a bigger signal must be more costly. In his introduction of the handicap principle Zahavi asserted that 'a character affected by sexual selection should be correlated to the handicap it imposes on the individual' (Zahari 1975, page 207). There are two important distinctions here that are easily and often overlooked.
The first distinction is between the signal (character) and the cost. Bigger signals will always correspond to more of something, like carbon or time, but they will not always cost more. The signal imposes a cost or burden; it is not the burden per se. '[P]eacocks have to drag massive tails around most of the year. By managing to find food and avoid predators despite such a burden, a peacock proves that he is the high-quality mate that the peahen is seeking' (Zahavi & Zahavi 1997, page XIV) . The tail is the signal; the cost of dragging the tail around is the burden.
The second distinction concerns the correlation. Most people think of a handicap as a burden or cost to an individual, but the principle and sports analogy refer to a handicapping system across individuals: bigger burdens are imposed on better competitors, reducing the disparities in performance. Failure to distinguish between tradeoffs within and correlations across individuals has been the source of considerable confusion in life history theory (van Noordwijk & de Jong 1986; Stearns 1992) . Sexual selection and any correlated handicap must occur across different individuals. The handicap principle is an assertion that the signal and the absolute cost are positively correlated across individuals.
In the example of handicapping racehorses, the added weight corresponds to the signal. The resulting decrement in speed is the cost. For the weights to serve as a reliable signal of quality, bigger weights must be associated with faster horses. For the weights to serve as a handicap, bigger weights must slow faster horses more than smaller weights slow slower horses. Reliable signalling is nested within the handicapping process. Consequently, reliable signalling is necessary for a handicap, but a handicap is not necessary for reliable signalling.
